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Summary 
 
Governments that lack the capacity to mine resources themselves have to attract foreign 
direct investment. However, since resources are not renewable countries need to capture a 
‘fair’ share of mineral resource rent to promote their development. While the sharp rise of the 
world prices of most minerals (in particular, gold, copper, iron and bauxite) multiplied the 
global turnover of the mining sector by 4.6 between 2002 and 2010, tax revenue earned by 
African governments from the non-renewable natural resource sector only grew by a factor of 
1.15 (Mansour 2014). The sharing of mineral resource rent between governments and 
investors is often criticised for being unfavourable to African governments. But what do we 
really know about the sharing of mineral resource rent in Africa? The aim of this study is to 
review theoretical and empirical studies on rent sharing in Africa, and to note their limitations 
regarding knowledge of the actual sharing of mineral rent. 
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Introduction 
 
Over half of African countries produce mineral resources, and twenty of the continent's fifty-
four countries are considered to be rich in natural resources according to International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) criteria (IMF 2012). Although it harbours around 30 per cent of all 
minerals on the planet, Africa is still the continent where least use is made of mineral 
resources. Expenditure on exploration, however, has risen significantly over the past decade. 
A record was set in 2012, when Africa accounted for 17 per cent of the global exploration 
budget (for all minerals combined), estimated at 23.42 billion USD1 – overtaking Canada, and 
taking second place behind Latin America. While the Democratic Republic of the Congo is 
the country where expenditure on exploration is highest, West Africa has become a priority 
region for expenditure on searching for gold deposits. The mining sector thus presents a 
number of issues for the development of countries. 
 
In most cases natural resources are public property, and the relationship between investors 
and governments is complex. Governments that lack the capacity to mine resources 
themselves have to attract foreign direct investment, but since resources are not renewable 
countries need to capture a fair share of mineral resource rent to aid their development.2 
From the point of view of mining companies, the role of governments is to maintain a stable 
system that is favourable to business. The characteristics of the sector ‒ namely 
irreversibility of investment and uncertainty as to whether a project will be profitable 
(extraction costs, sale price of the mineral extracted, etc.) ‒ make the extraction of natural 
resources particularly sensitive to economic policy decisions. Decisions on taxation can have 
consequences that are crucial to the sector's development. 
 
So far, mining taxation systems have adapted to changes in the price of raw materials. In the 
1980s and 1990s commodity prices were low, and governments granted companies a large 
number of tax and non-tax concessions for various periods of time. The mining sector has 
been liberalised (Campbell 2004), and African countries are developing their tax systems to 
attract foreign investors (Otto 1998; Land 2007). Exceptions to general law are becoming a 
key component of tax frameworks to reduce the tax burden of multinationals, and hence to 
make deposits more profitable. Between 2002 and 2012, the sharp rise of the world prices of 
most minerals (in particular, gold, copper, iron and bauxite) multiplied the global turnover of 
the mining sector by 4.6, against only 1.15 for tax revenue earned by African governments 
from non-renewable natural resource (Mansour, 2014). One hundred and ten nations 
recently amended their mining codes or are planning to do so (Otto et al. 2006 and Appendix 
1). The current political context of the sector is strained: governments want to keep a more 
important share of the mining rent compared to previous decades, and companies fear ‘hold-
ups’3 or expropriations similar to what occurred in Latin America (Daniel et al. 2010; Duncan 
2006). 
 
The development of taxation systems and tax competition between countries (Land 2007) 
highlight the lack of a theoretical and/or empirical consensus on the issue of how mineral 
                                                 
1  SNL Metals Economics Group: Worldwide Exploration Trends 2013. 
2  All the big multinationals in the sector have a presence in Africa: Glencore Xstrata (iron in Mauritania, zinc in Burkina 
Faso, copper and cobalt in DR Congo, nickel in Tanzania, copper, cobalt and zinc in Zambia, zinc in Namibia, chromium 
in South Africa, etc.); Rio Tinto (aluminium in Cameroon and Ghana, bauxite in Guinea, ilmenite in Mozambique, copper 
and ilmenite in South Africa); Anglo American (diamonds in Botswana, Namibia and South Africa, platinum in 
Zimbabwe, iron and manganese in South Africa); Barrick (copper in Zambia); Newmont (gold in Ghana); AngloGold 
Ashanti (gold in Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Namibia, DR Congo and South Africa); and Kinross (gold in Ghana and 
Mauritania). 
3  Opportunistic behaviour on the part of governments, which are tempted to increase the tax burden once investments 
have been made. 
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resource rent should be shared. It now appears to be vital to build a win-win relationship, and 
hence to find ways of achieving a fair sharing of revenue between governments and 
investors (Blake and Roberts 2006; Daniel et al. 2010). The aim of this study is to review 
theoretical and empirical studies on rent sharing in developing countries. Re-examining the 
definition of resource rent and the concept of fair sharing between investors and government 
helps to understand the debates. Reviewing the empirical studies carried out on the subject 
will then make it possible to identify the existing tools used to analyse sharing of resource 
rent, and their weaknesses. 
 
 
1  Theoretical approaches: definition of rent 
and optimal taxation 
 
The main criticism of taxation is that it causes economic distortions which lead to loss of 
economic efficiency and well-being for society (Sandmo 1979). In theory, taxing up to 100 
per cent of rent would not change investment and extraction decisions. A rent tax seems to 
be close to a neutral tax. In practice, however, there are many obstacles to apply a neutral 
tax instrument to the sector, including geological uncertainties and constraints on production 
capacity at the global level. Governments, therefore, try to create a tax system to capture a 
proportion of rent that is deemed to be fair, whilst encouraging private investors to explore, 
develop and exploit minerals. This first section examines the definition of rent and the 
theoretical foundations that support neutrality in its taxation, and then the tax instruments and 
other fees which are charged to the sector.  
 
1.1 Taxation of rent and economic efficiency 
 
The definition of rent that is most widely used today is: ‘the excess of revenues over all costs 
of production, including those of discovery and development, as well as the normal return to 
capital’ (IMF 2012: 5). Although the definition appears to be straightforward, rent is still 
difficult to understand. 
 
Ricardo (1817) defines rent in terms of difference of agricultural land fertility. He observes 
that for the same level of output the least fertile land requires the greatest amount of labour 
or capital, and that if the price does not cover costs, production occurs at a loss and output is 
not brought to the market. It is, therefore, the most productive – the most fertile – land that 
will yield a larger profit. The rent is a long-term rent, which therefore depends on differences 
in fertility between land, and corresponds to the difference between the marginal cost of 
production and the sale price. Rent does not play a role in setting the sale price of the 
resource; rather, it is a result of this price-setting. According to Garnaut and Clunies Ross 
(1975, 1983), this ‘differential rent’ or ‘pure rent’ is the defining characteristic of mining 
industries – the fact that production conditions, which depend on the characteristics of 
exploitation of the resource (location, difficulty in terms of exploitation, quality of the resource, 
etc.), cannot be identically reproduced. This means that taxing up to 100 per cent of the 
differential rent generated by the sector should not alter the allocation of resources within the 
economy: it is a neutral tax. 
 
From the second half of the nineteenth century onwards the concept of rent expanded to 
encompass all advantageous situations, which made it possible to increase the revenue of 
an economic operator (Khan 2000;4 Otto and Cordes 2002; Otto et al. 2006). Economic rent 
generally stems from private property and limited supply: contracts, patents, barriers to entry 
                                                 
4  The author distinguishes between at least six different types of rent. 
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into certain markets, and so on.5 The task of valuing rent is complicated, as long-term rent 
can differ from short-term rent. 
 
In the short term, production continues for as long as the sale price covers variable costs 
such as labour and energy (McDonald and Siegel 1985). If the market price is below the 
average total cost of production but equal to or greater than the average variable cost, the 
activity yields a short-term rent, also known as ‘quasi-rent’. This quasi-rent corresponds to 
the difference between the revenue generated by the activity and the variable production 
costs – the cost of fixed factors valued at the market price (Otto et al. 2006). Quasi-rent can, 
however, be greater than fixed costs alone, when the revenue generated by the activity 
covers all variable costs and some of the fixed costs. 
 
Mining activity comprises three stages: exploration, development and extraction (Garnaut 
and Clunies Ross 1983). During the first two stages (exploration and development), 
investments are large and constitute fixed costs which cannot be reversed by the investor. At 
the end of first stage, quasi-rent corresponds to expected revenue less exploration and 
development costs of the deposit. At the end of the second stage, quasi-rent corresponds to 
expected revenue less extraction cost. Total rent, which takes into account all costs 
associated with the various stages of the project and all revenue generated by the project, 
can be less than the sum of quasi-rents. Therefore, seeking to achieve neutrality of taxation 
entails seeking to tax, not quasi-rents, but rent valued over the entire lifetime of the project 
(Boadway and Keen 2010). 
 
In a dynamic view of rent, Hotelling (1931) introduces the issue of inter-temporal 
management of non-renewable natural resources. How should one allocate a given quantity 
of resources between different periods of time, so as to maximise the utility derived from the 
extraction and consumption of the resource? He then defines ‘scarcity rent’. The extraction of 
a resource generates a cost of use that corresponds to the opportunity cost of reducing stock 
for future use (Tilton 2004). The producer then seeks to maximise the net present value of 
the project – revenue less the various costs over time. The investor increases his output until 
the sale price covers the marginal cost of production and the opportunity cost. Valuing this 
opportunity cost is therefore of crucial importance, as this determines the taxable rent and 
alters investment and extraction decisions. 
 
Whilst the aim of the tax system is to capture rent throughout the lifetime of the project, 
leaving the required minimum return on investment for the investor, inaccurate valuation of 
the economic rent, and hence the net present value of the project, inevitably causes 
economic distortions: over-exploitation or, conversely, under-exploitation of the resource (Guj 
2012). The valuation of rent is subject to a certain number of constraints: knowledge of sale 
prices, costs and the discount rate. This information is difficult to obtain or predict, but 
absolutely necessary in order to apply an optimal and economically neutral tax. 
 
1.2 Taxation of rent and the increasing number of objectives of taxation in 
developing countries 
 
Taxation of the mining sector is essentially a delicate balancing act between the desire to 
attract the international investors necessary to tap into mineral resource rent, and sufficient 
capturing of this rent by and for the government (Laporte and Rota-Graziosi 2014). This 
balancing act is made particularly delicate by the characteristics of the mining sector (non-
renewable resources, irreversible investments and high uncertainty), and international 
competition to attract foreign technical expertise, which is limited but essential to extract the 
                                                 
5  If the factor of production is public property, which is available in an unlimited quantity and accessible to everyone, there 
is no rent (this applies to the environment, for example). 
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resource. In practice, the competition between countries means that governments capture 
about 50 per cent of rent (Land 2008), and that investment depends not only on the current 
system for sharing resource rent, but also on the anticipated system for sharing resource rent 
(Boadway and Keen 2010). 
 
Anticipation of taxation during the various stages of a project is crucial for investors. If an 
investor thinks that the tax system will be unfavourable to him during the production period, 
there is a risk that he will not make his investment (hold-up risk). However, if the tax system 
is changed after investments are made, the investor no longer has any choice. As long as it 
covers variable costs, production is economically preferable to stopping production. So as 
the capital invested by a company increases, the balance of power shifts from the investor to 
the government (Vernon 1971). Governments therefore offer significant advantages during 
the exploration and development phases, but can decide to take these advantages away 
during the extraction phase. The temptation to reduce the advantages given to a company is 
all the greater where the investment proves to be profitable, which is especially true during 
periods of high international prices (e.g. Zambia, Venezuela and Ecuador in 2008). This risk 
of time inconsistency in tax policy is due to the government’s fundamental difficulty in 
identifying the optimal tax system in an uncertain environment. 
 
Therefore, aside from the neutrality of taxation, other political, practical and administrative 
considerations inform the choice of instruments used to tax the mining sector (Daniel et al. 
2010; Otto et al. 2006; Lund 2009; Baunsgaard 2001; Land 2008). Whether to make tax 
revenue secure, reduce the risks borne by the government or the investor, or facilitate tax 
administration, a large number of instruments are implemented in countries and help to 
determine the share of mineral resource rent that goes to the government (Appendix 2). 
Certain taxes are specific to mining activity, and others are common to all formal companies 
within the economy even though their tax base or rate may differ from those under the 
common law system (Charlet et al. 2013). Non-tax instruments supplement taxation in the 
capturing of mineral resource rent: royalties, production sharing, acquisition by the 
government of free equity, contributions to expenditure on local infrastructure, and so on. In 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the government owns 5 per cent of the capital of all 
mining companies that operate in the country, and has proposed increasing its stake to 35 
per cent. In Burkina Faso this stake is 10 per cent, and in Mongolia the government has 
acquired 34 per cent of the capital in the Oyu Tolgoi project. This situation means that the 
government is both a regulator of the sector and a shareholder of mining companies at the 
same time (Allaire 2013). Every instrument for sharing resource rent has a greater or lesser 
impact on the exploitation of the resource. 
 
According to the classification of Otto et al. (2006), in rem taxes (production-based taxes – 
unit-based royalties, ad valorem or specific royalties, sales taxes which affect the variable 
costs of the project, import and export duties, value added tax, withholdings tax on loan 
interest and services, registration fees and property taxes which affect fixed costs) directly 
increase production costs, and thereby generate economic distortions which change 
investment and production decisions (Guj 2012). In personam taxes (profit-based taxes – 
taxes on profits, additional profits taxes, withholding taxes on remitted dividends, royalty 
based on some measure of profit, etc.) are based on net revenue, and are therefore closer to 
a tax on rent. But the use of in personam taxes alone only allows for inadequate sharing of 
rent, due to the sensitivity of their base to transfer prices and the more or less aggressive tax 
optimisation strategies of private investors (Radon 2007). To the criterion of neutrality, 
Baunsgaard (2001) adds the criteria of risk-sharing and ease of tax administration. In rem 
taxes limit the risk for the government by making revenue secure from the beginning of the 
project, and are simple to administer. 
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Identifying the tax system which allows a fair share of rent seems to depend on the degree of 
risk aversion of the government and private investors, and on the government's 
administrative capacity to collect the tax. Considering this, the optimal share of rent would 
therefore vary from one government to the next (and even from one ministry to the next: the 
Ministry of Finance versus the Ministry of Mines, Petroleum and Hydrocarbons). Given that a 
system needs to be stable in order to attract companies, during negotiations a tax system 
that makes it possible to reconcile the expectations of all stakeholders is critical. 
 
The number of goals for sharing resource rent has increased since the 1990s. Expectations 
with regard to mining sector taxation go beyond mere revenue-raising, and extend to the 
environment (Sinkala 2009; Collier and Venables 2014), the impact of the sector on the local 
labour market, or economic development in its broadest sense (Bird 2014). Inter-temporal 
management of public funds levied from the mining sector also features prominently in the 
literature (Baunsgaard et al. 2012; Traoré and Djiofack Zebaze 2015). The aim is no longer 
to tax rent as much as possible in order to maximise public funds without altering the 
production chain, but to maximise social well-being. The framework of the tax system is thus 
moving away from the pursuit of economic neutrality, and demonstrates the importance that 
is attached to each objective by mining governments. Every system has consequences for 
project life and hence the sharing of rent between governments and investors (Cawood 
1999; Cordes 1995; Otto et al. 2006). The increase in the number of objectives for mining 
taxation is giving rise to a complex web of taxes, making it difficult to assess the sharing of 
rent and its economic impact. 
 
 
2  Empirical approaches: sharing of resource 
rent and available sources of information 
 
The sharing of mineral resource rent between governments and investors is often criticised 
for being unfavourable to African governments. However, few studies put figures on this 
phenomenon. After a description of the two dominant methods of valuing rent, the main 
indicators used to assess tax systems are presented. Shafiee et al. (2009) propose a 
literature review of empirical studies that use these two methods, but do not address sharing 
of resource rent. Smith (2013) proposes a review of literature focusing on the sharing of 
mineral resource rent, and highlights the importance of modelling choices on the result. 
 
2.1 Calculating rent: the discounted cash flow method and the modern asset 
pricing model 
 
The net present value (NPV) that should be generated during the lifetime of a project 
depends on annual mineral output, exploration and development costs, capital costs and 
extraction costs, the lifetime of the project, the sale price, and the discount rate that is 
associated with the project and incorporates the risk (Guj and Garzon 2007). Two main 
methods are used to determine NPV: the discounted cash flow (DCF) method and the 
modern asset pricing (MAP) model. 
 
Discounted cash flow (DCF) method. If a project is certain and without risks, the discount 
rate is the opportunity cost of the capital. If cash flow is uncertain and risky, the discount rate 
is made up of the opportunity cost of the capital and the premium that compensates the risk 
assumed by the investor. This risk may be project-specific and/or country-specific. Most 
models incorporate a single cash flow, but allow for sensitivity analyses that consider 
different cost or price profiles. Monte Carlo simulations are often performed in order to 
determine a probability distribution for each uncertain project variable and thereby obtain 
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different cash flows (Bohren and Schilbred 1980). Even at the lowest anticipated price, a 
mining project should be able to break even (Crowson 1998). The following are needed to 
create a DCF model: (i) forecasts for the price of the mineral over the entire duration of the 
project, (ii) a valuation of costs, making it possible to calculate the revenue from the project, 
and (iii) the discount rate of the project after tax. 
 
Several authors underline the limitations of this method (Bradley 1998; Daniel et al. 2010; 
Mackie-Mason 1990; Samis et al. 2007; Smith 2013; Salahor 1998). On the one hand, it 
requires perfect knowledge of the economic indicators that are involved in calculating NPV, 
and, on the other hand, it entails knowing the risk associated with each stage of the project. If 
this is not the case, the modeller most often assumes uniform risk, which is not necessarily 
realistic for long-term projects whose risk decreases over time. Finally, these models are 
arithmetical and non-behavioural, which limits the scope of the results and assumes that 
taxation is neutral in respect of production and investment decisions (Smith 2013). Finally, 
the model does not take account of managerial risk – the possibility that the mine may be 
abandoned before the end of its life cycle, or that work may be suspended temporarily (Smith 
and McCardle 1998). 
 
Modern asset pricing (MAP) model. In order to take different risk profiles into account, an 
alternative to the DCF model is to calculate the certainty equivalent. Brennan and Schwartz 
(1985) were the first to use this method to value natural resource exploitation projects 
(Grinblatt and Titman 2002; Laughton 1998). This method involves determining the cash flow 
that the investor is willing to receive without risk, and comparing it with expected future cash 
flows. The investor does not mind whether he receives this certainty equivalent or the 
uncertain future cash flow. The net present value of the project is then defined as the sum 
total of certainty equivalent flows discounted at the risk-free rate. The MAP model is an 
elementary form of the ‘real option value’6 model, which takes into account, within a 
stochastic forecasting model, the price dynamics of the mineral and incorporates the 
interaction between the uncertainty as to price and the risk in terms of the project's value. 
Several price change models exist, according to the type of mineral that is studied (Salahor 
1998; Baker et al. 1998). In 1996, Laughton used the MAP method to assess the financial 
structure of a mining project. According to Moel and Tufano (2002), companies are 
increasingly using the MAP method to make their own forecasts. To create this type of model 
(Guj and Garzon 2007),7 it is necessary to: (i) choose the stochastic price change forecasting 
model, (ii) determine the price risk due to uncertainty regarding the price of the mineral over 
the period and its discount rate,8 and (iii) build the cash flow model for the project whilst 
taking account of the prices predicted by the forecasting model and information concerning 
the costs of the project. The main difficulty of the MAP method lies in identifying the right risk 
profile. Most of the time only the price is regarded as uncertain, and the costs of the project 
are considered to be known. It is therefore necessary to obtain information concerning 
forecasts for the price of commodities on the financial market.9 Bradley (1998) shows that 
valuing net revenue using the DCF method or the MAP method gives different results, and 
generates revenue flows with different profiles. 
 
Both methods have advantages and disadvantages. However, in both cases the two crucial 
points in calculating rent are having access to economic information concerning the project, 
and testing different risk profiles (Commonwealth Secretariat and ICMM 2009). Only after 
                                                 
6  By comparison with the real option value model, only managerial flexibility, i.e. the possibility that the mine will be 
abandoned before it reaches the end of its life cycle or that activity will temporarily be suspended, is not taken into 
account (Podda Abouna 2014). 
7  Quoted in Podda Abouna et al. (2014). 
8  The discount rate is the risk-free interest rate, because risk is already taken into account in the stochastic model. 
9  Depending on the mineral, the London Metal Exchange, KITCO or the New York Mercantile Exchange websites. 
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evaluating the NPV for each project developed in the country is it possible to measure the 
sharing of rent between governments and investors, and its effect on investment decisions. 
 
2.2 Rent sharing indicators 
 
Several indicators are used in the literature to assess tax systems in the mining sector 
(Daniel et al. 2008; Otto et al. 2006; Boadway and Keen 2010; IMF 2012). Only the ones that 
are most widely used in empirical studies are presented here (see Table 1). The investor is 
interested in profitability indicators, whereas the government seeks to measure its share of 
rent. 
 
Table 1 Main indicators selected in empirical literature 
 
Agent Objective Indicator 
Investor 
Neutrality 
Marginal effective tax rate (METR) 
Breakeven price 
Profitability 
Internal rate of return (IRR) on the project  
Payback period 
Identification of risks Coefficient of variation of Net Present Value and IRR 
Government 
Tax revenue 
Average effective tax rate (AETR) 
Expected government revenue  
Identification of risks  
Time profile of government revenue 
Coefficient of variation in expected tax revenue 
 
 
The indicators chosen by companies measure the profitability of their investment over the 
entire duration of a project. The investor's share of the rent corresponds to the discounted 
value of net cash flows after tax. The profitability of the investment is valued by the internal 
rate of return (IRR) on the investment, which corresponds to the discounted rate for which 
the sum total of cash flows is nil. In principle, investment only occurs if the opportunity cost of 
the capital is lower than the internal rate of return on the project. The marginal effective tax 
rate (METR), for which a proxy can be calculated from the IRR before and after tax, captures 
the impact of the tax system on the decision to invest. For a given level of project profitability 
required by the investor, it measures the additional profitability that the project must yield in 
order to cover tax liabilities. It may be regarded as an indicator of tax system neutrality. 
According to Brealey and Myers (2005), the IRR calculation method does not make it 
possible to take account of variability of the opportunity cost of capital over time, and makes 
it difficult to compare projects with each other. Empirical studies often compare, for the same 
project, the impact of different tax systems on the sharing of rent from a single project. 
 
The indicator that is most commonly used to measure the share of rent captured by the 
government is the average effective tax rate (AETR). AETR is the ratio of the NPV of 
government revenue and the NPV of project pre-tax net cash flows.10 All taxes specific to the 
sector, such as those under the General Taxation Code and other charges and fees, must be 
considered. The AETR makes it possible to assess the distribution of the tax burden between 
companies, in order to assess fairness in the treatment of companies (Fullerton and King 
1984; Johnston 2003) and make international comparisons (Daniel et al. 2010; Charlet et al. 
2013). The share of government revenue in total project benefits, measured by the ratio of 
tax revenue paid by the investor and discounted net cash flow less the initial investment, 
makes it possible to assess the sensitivity of government revenue to variation in prices 
                                                 
10  Several calculation methods are used in the literature (Otto et al. 2000; Devereux and Griffith 2003). 
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and/or costs, and hence how progressive the tax system is.11 A progressive tax system can 
encourage the government to develop the sector, but a regressive system can enable the 
government to guarantee a minimum level of tax revenue (Brewer et al. 1989). Calculating 
the coefficient of variation in the proportion of rent received by the government for a given 
revenue distribution makes it possible to ascertain the possible variation in government 
revenue – that is, the risk assumed by the government. 
 
2.3 Review of empirical studies 
 
Few empirical studies quantify the sharing of rent between investors and governments in the 
natural resource sector (see Appendix 3). Oil is the sector that has been studied the most 
(Blake and Roberts 2006; Daniel et al. 2008; Tordo 2007), followed by gold (inter alia Brewer 
et al. 1989; Otto et al. 2006). In the great majority of cases studies are carried out on 
hypothetical mining projects, and the authors apply different tax systems to the project (Blake 
and Roberts 2006; Brewer et al. 1989), or only change the base for one tax in order to 
determine the impact on investment indicators or the capturing of rent by the government. 
Special attention has been paid to different types of royalties (Otto et al. 2006; Daniel et al. 
2010). It is rare for simulations to analyse the overall framework of a mining tax system for a 
single country. Charges and fees are often dealt with secondarily to tax instruments (Blake 
and Roberts 2006), which makes the calculation for sharing of resource rent incomplete. The 
aforementioned indicators are commonly used by the authors to combine the operation of a 
tax with an objective of neutrality of taxation or government revenue. The most common 
method is discounted cash flow, combined with ad hoc sensitivity analyses. Few studies take 
into account the effects of interaction between the mining sector and the rest of the economy 
(Thomas 2010). Finally, it is important to note that there has been very little analysis of the 
tax systems in developing countries – more specifically, in African countries.  
 
The IMF made efforts to improve the knowledge of states in the area of rent-sharing. The 
Fiscal Analysis of Resource Industries (FARI) model is now used in countries receiving IMF 
technical assistance in the mining and oil sectors. However, the basic economic data, the tax 
information and the results of rent sharing studies are not publicly available for at least two 
reasons: (1) technical assistance reports are compiled from confidential data; and (2) they 
are the property of the local Ministry of Finance in countries receiving technical assistance, 
and may be published only with their agreement. Furthermore, some African countries that 
are rich in natural resources do not have specific technical assistance. 
 
This literature review shows that it is currently very difficult to ascertain the actual sharing of 
rent between African governments and investors in a standardised manner. Economic data 
on projects is either not widely available or difficult for researchers to use, which forces them 
to create hypothetical mine projects. However, as Otto et al. (2006) and all of the sensitivity 
analyses in this literature point out, tax system evaluation indicators are sensitive to the 
characteristics of mines and changes in their economic environment. In addition no maps are 
available, making regional or international comparisons difficult. In the current context of 
renegotiating mining codes, creating an innovative database that allows standardised 
assessment of the sharing of mineral resource rent in Africa would appear, in the light of the 
studies analysed, to be very important. 
 
2.4 Problems faced by empirical studies: lack of economic and tax data 
 
Ascertaining how rent is shared between governments and investors requires the capacity to 
calculate the NPV that should be generated for each project. Whichever method is used, the 
following must be known: the annual production of the mineral, the capital costs and 
                                                 
11  This particular indicator is still under revision in the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department. 
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operating costs for each stage of the project, its lifetime, the sale price and the associated 
discount rate. The fact that few empirical studies have been carried out on mining projects 
clearly illustrates the difficulty of obtaining and processing this information. Economic data on 
industrial mining companies (feasibility studies, financial statements and technical reports) is 
available online for companies listed on stock exchanges in Canada, the USA, Australia and 
the UK. Data in feasibility studies (forecasts) can be compared with information held in 
activity reports (implementation). It may therefore be difficult, but not impossible, to create 
the economic part of the database.  
 
To measure the sharing of NPV between investors and the government, it is also necessary 
to know all the tax instruments and other fees charged on the sector. None of the existing 
economic databases contains all this information on the mining sector. The FERDI database 
presents the tax revenue levied from the sector for forty-one countries in sub-Saharan Africa 
over the period 1980-2010 (Mansour 2014). The countries listed in the database make up 
over 95 per cent of the countries that the World Bank describes as being rich in natural 
resources. Revenue from oil and gas and that from mining activities are combined, but few 
countries are rich in both hydrocarbons, and minerals other than hydrocarbons. Revenue 
collected from activities in the mining, oil and gas sectors is separated from that collected 
from other activities. The ‘taxes on non-renewable natural resources’ category combines the 
tax revenue levied from extractive industries (corporation tax, royalties and also profit-
sharing, dividends received on equity held in state-owned enterprises, and dividends and 
other investment income received on holdings acquired directly by the government in 
extractive industries). The ICTD database lists the revenue levied from the natural resource 
sector, and breaks it down by type of tax: income taxes, corporation taxes, indirect taxes 
(mainly export taxes) and non-tax revenue (Prichard et al. 2014). These two databases 
propose a sector-based approach, which limits the opportunity to ascertain the sharing of 
rent between governments and investors for a mineral, much less analyse its determining 
factors. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) promotes accountable 
management of natural resources, by making public the revenue paid by firms. The database 
is broken down by country and by sector (oil/gas and mining). However, the EITI objective is 
not the evaluation of sharing of rent, and does not allow this to be done. 
 
To measure the sharing of rent, it is necessary to list the tax codes, mining codes, customs 
codes and mining agreements that are in force in Africa. Charlet et al. (2013) list the taxes 
levied in French-speaking African countries (see Appendix 2), which would make it possible 
to recalculate the revenue collected from each project and hence the sharing of rent. 
 
Based on this tax information and project economic data, the expected sharing of rent 
between governments and investors can be calculated for each mining project. It could be 
possible to compare the theoretical tax revenue with the effective tax revenue in the EITI 
database. The gap between expected revenue and achievement can be explained by a 
change in operating conditions (geology, costs and resource prices), failure of tax 
administration, or tax optimisation practices of mining companies. 
 
 
3  Conclusion 
 
The aim of this study is to review theoretical and empirical studies on the sharing of resource 
rent in developing countries in order to identify the difficulties encountered in conducting this 
type of exercise, so that tools to mitigate them can subsequently be proposed. 
 
Having reviewed the theoretical approaches to the valuation of rent on a microeconomic 
level, we find that mineral resource rent is a concept that is difficult to understand and 
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measure: rent can change as a project moves from one phase to the next, and risk and the 
discount rate of the resource must be taken into account. The most widely-accepted 
definition of rent relates to the calculation of the net present value of a project – ‘the excess 
of revenues over all costs of production, including those of discovery and development, as 
well as the normal return to capital’ (IMF 2012: 5). However, the possibility of capturing tax 
revenue in an economically neutral way can only be guaranteed if governments have the 
capacity to value the economic rent of a project. 
 
Due to the difficulty of obtaining all the information necessary to calculate mineral resource 
rent, governments are increasing the number of tax instruments, charges and fees in order to 
capture a share of resource rent that they deem fair, but which ultimately depends strictly on 
the objectives that they have set for themselves. This is why different indicators are used in 
the literature to assess tax systems in the natural resource sector according to the objectives 
of governments and investors. A review of empirical studies shows that few studies are 
conducted in developing countries, and African countries in particular, and that they are 
mainly based on hypothetical projects. Knowledge of the actual distribution of rent between 
investors and governments is scant, and knowledge of its determining factors is even more 
so.  
 
The distribution of mineral resource rent in Africa cannot be analysed without access to 
figures and transparent, standardised information. The creation of a rent-sharing database 
will allow in-depth research into the value of the sector's tax potential, the tax optimisation 
practices of multinationals and the knock-on effects that the mining sector has on the rest of 
the economy; this is currently not possible given the actual knowledge available on sharing of 
resource rent in Africa. 
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 Appendix 1 Renegotiation of contracts in Africa (as at 30 September 2013) 
Country/company Mineral Year Status/no. of 
contracts 
Contracts Effect of renegotiation 
Democratic 
Republic of the 
Congo 
 
Génerale des 
Carrières et des 
Mines (Gécamines) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Entreprise minière 
de Kisenge 
Manganèse 
(EMKM-Mn) 
 
 
 
La Société Minière 
de Bakwanga 
‘MIBA’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Office des Mines 
d’or de Kilo-Moto 
(Okimo/Sokimo) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Société aurifière du 
Kivu et du Maniema 
 
 
 
 
Copper, 
cobalt, 
zinc, nickel, 
uranium 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Manganese 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diamonds 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gold 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gold 
 
 
 
 
 
2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2008 
 
 
 
 
 
Renegotiated 
(23) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Renegotiated 
and terminated 
(3) 
 
 
Renegotiated 
(1) 
 
Renegotiated 
and terminated 
(1) 
 
Renegotiated 
(5) 
 
 
 
 
 
Renegotiated 
and terminated 
(1) 
 
 
Renegotiated 
(5) 
 
 
 
 
Renegotiated 
and terminated 
(3) 
 
 
Renegotiated 
(3) 
 
 
 
 
Anvil Mining Kulu Concentrate 
Kinsevere, AMCK Sprl 
BOSS Mining Sprl (Mukondo Mining and 
Savannah Mining) 
Compagnie Minière de Tondo, CMT Sprl 
Compagnie Minière du Sud Katanga, 
CMCK Sprl 
Congolaise des Mines et de 
Développement, COMIDE Sprl 
Compagnie Minière de Luisha, COMILU, 
Sprl 
Compagnie Minière de Musonoi, 
COMMUS Sprl 
DRC Copper and Cobalt Project, DCP 
Sari 
Kamoto Copper Company, KCC Sari 
Kasonta Lupota Mines, KALUMINES 
Sprl 
KIMIN Sprl (lease Gécamines – 
SOMIKA Sprl) 
Kipushi Corporation, KICO Sari 
Minière de Kasombo, MIKAS Sprl 
Minière de Kalumbwe Myunga, MKM 
Sprl 
Mutanda ya Mukonkota Mining, MUMI 
Sprl 
PTM Sprl (CAYMAN) 
Ruashi Mining Sprl 
Shituru Mining Corporate, SMCO Sprl 
Société Minière de Kolwezi, SMK Sprl 
Société d’Exploitation de Kipoi, SEK 
Sprl 
Société Minière de Kabolela et de 
Kipese, SMKK Sprl 
Société de Traitement de Terril de 
Lubumbashi, STL/GTL Sprl 
SWANMINES Sprl 
 
Chabara Mining 
Congo Zinc 
PZCE 
 
 
ORAMA PROPERTIES Sprl 
 
 
SENTINELLES Sprl 
 
 
 
Minière de Kasai, MIKAS Sprl 
Société Minière de la Lulua, SML Sprl 
Société Minière de Sankuru, SMDS Sprl 
Société  Kasaienne de Diamants, SKD 
Sprl 
Société Minière de Lubulangi, LUMI Sprl 
 
DGI Mining Sprl 
 
 
 
 
Assistance Technique et Financier, ATF 
Blue Rosé Sprl 
Borgakim Sprl 
Gorumbwa Sprl 
Kibali Gold Sprl 
 
AMANI Sprl 
RAMBI Sprl 
TANGOLD Sprl 
 
 
GEMICO Sprl 
GMB Sprl 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Financial effects 
 
 
 
- Signature bonuses 
 
Based on the principle of 
calculating with reference to 
the Chinese model, the 
signature bonus has been set 
at 35 USD/tCU, or 1% of the 
volume of reserves for the 
other substances 
 
Total of USD307,283,040 has 
been released as follows: 
 
- Gécamines: 
USD290,613,040 
-Kisenge Manganèse: 
USD9,000,000 
-MIBA: mainly prospecting 
contracts 
- OKIMO: USD4,500,000 
- SAKIMA: USD 70,000 
- SODIMICO: USD3,100,000. 
 
 
The first tranche of the 
signature bonus amount 
expected for 2009 is 
USD66,220,000. 
 
- Area fees 
 
Renegotiation has benefited 
the state treasury by 
releasing evaded area fees of 
approximately USD5,206,000, 
mainly for the partnerships 
with BORGKIM (OKIMO) for 
USD5,100,000 and MMK 
(SODIMICO) for 
USD106,000. 
 
- Royalties 
 
Renegotiation has made it 
possible to incorporate the 
principle of payment of 
royalties to state-owned 
enterprises when 
partnerships commence 
production. 
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(SAKIMA) 
 
 
 
 
 
Société de 
Développement 
Industriel et Minier 
du Congo 
(Sodimico) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copper 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2008 
 
 
Renegotiated 
and terminated 
(3) 
 
Renegotiated 
(2) 
 
Renegotiated 
and terminated 
(3) 
DFSA Sprl 
 
CAR Sprl 
COCO Mining Sprl 
SOL Sprl 
 
MMK Sari 
Long Fei Sprl 
 
KGHM Sprl 
MUYAFA Sprl 
SOCOMIE Sprl 
Guinea 
 
Rio Tinto 
 
 
BSG Resources 
 
 
RUSAL 
 
 
Iron 
 
 
Iron 
 
 
Bauxite 
 
 
2011 
 
 
n/a 
 
 
n/a 
 
 
Renegotiated 
(1) 
 
Intention to 
renegotiate 
 
Intention to 
renegotiate 
 
 
Simfer SA 
 
 
 
 
 
Friguia 
 
 
Settlement agreement: 
government-owned equity, 
granting of presidential 
decrees, taxation and royalty 
and infrastructure 
Liberia 
 
Arcellor-Mittal 
 
 
Iron 
 
 
2005 
 
 
Renegotiated 
(1) 
 The Indian giant set prices of 
the mineral itself. After a year 
of negotiation, the group is 
now following market prices; 
the tax exemption has been 
ended. 
Sierra Leone 
 
African Minerals 
 
London Mining 
 
 
Iron 
 
Iron 
 
 
2011 
 
2011 
 
 
Renegotiated 
(1) 
Renegotiated 
(1) 
 
 
Tonkolili Iron 
 
Marampa 
 
 
Replaces the clause in the 
London Mining contract 
concerning a ten-year break 
for the company which 
reduced its tax rate from 
37.5% to 6% increasing in 
stages to 30%. Source: ‘The 
revised London Mining 
Agreement’ 
<http//www.christianaid.org.uk
/Images/sierra-leone-mining-
briefing.pdf> 
Ghana 
 
South Africa’s 
AngloGold Ashanti 
Newmont of 
Greenwood 
 
 
Gold 
 
 
Gold 
 
 
n/a 
 
 
n/a 
 
 
Intention to 
renegotiate on 
the part of the 
government 
but not 
accepted by 
the company 
 
 
n/a 
In 2010 Ghana changed the 
mining royalty rate to a fixed 
rate of 5% from a variable 
rate of 3-6%. AngloGold 
Ashanti and Newmont of 
Greenwood have stability 
agreements set at 3%. The 
government wants to 
renegotiate the stability 
agreement. 
Central African 
Republic 
 
AREVA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Axmin 
 
 
 
Uranium 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gold 
 
 
 
2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009/2010 
 
 
 
Renegotiated 
(1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Renegotiated 
(1) 
 
 
 
Bakouma 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bambari/Ouaka 
In 2007 Areva bought UraMin, 
a Canadian uranium 
extraction company which at 
that time owned the Bakouma 
concession. The CAR 
protested and demanded that 
Areva renegotiate the 
contract. In August 2008, 
Areva agreed to pay USD40 
million over five years, to 
develop the country’s 
infrastructure and to employ 
900 local workers at the peak 
of its activity. At the end of 
2009, the CAR demanded 
nearly FCFA2 billion (USD 4 
million) in taxes and royalties 
in relation to the transfer of 
UraMin. 
 
Axmin requested an 
exploration permit in March 
2009 but only received one in 
August 2010 after agreeing to 
pay a bonus of USD11 million 
and delivering three 4x4 
vehicles. 
Source: Charlet et al. (2013).
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Appendix 2 Examples of tax systems in French-speaking Africa  
 
Country 
 
Legislation 
 
Mining royalty (% of 
total turnover) 
 
Government 
stake 
 
Profit tax 
 
Minimum 
lump sum 
tax 
Tax on 
income 
from 
transferable 
securities 
Burkina 
Faso 
 
 
 
 
Law no. 031-
2003/AN of 8 May 
2003 
Decree no. 2005-
048/PRES of 3 
February 2005 
Decree no. 2005-
682/PRES/PM/MCE
/MFB of 30 
December 2005 
7% - diamonds and 
precious stones 
4% - base metals and 
other mineral 
substances 
3% - industrial gold and 
precious metals 
3% - artisanally mined 
gold, and tax relief of 
100 CFA francs per 
gram is granted before 
the rate is applied 
10% free 
equity 
interest 
Exemption 
during 
exploration 
phase 
Rate reduced 
by 10 
percentage 
points during 
production 
phase 
0.5% 
Exemption 
during 
exploration 
phase 
Exemption 
for 7 years 
during 
production 
phase 
12.5% 
Exemption 
during 
exploration 
phase 
Rate halved 
during 
production 
phase 
(6.25%) 
Cameroon 
 
 
 
 
 
Law no. 2010/011 
of 29 July 2010 
Law no. 001-2001 
of 16 April 2001 
Decree no. 
2002/648/PM of 26 
March 2002 
8% - Precious stones: 
(diamonds, emeralds, 
rubies, sapphires) 
3% - Precious metals: 
(gold, platinum, etc.) 
2.5% - Base metals and 
other mineral 
substances 
2% - Geothermal 
deposits, source water, 
mineral and thermal 
mineral water 
10% free 
equity 
interest + 
right to 
acquire an 
additional 
stake in cash 
up to a total 
limit that 
cannot 
exceed 20% 
35% (+3.5% 
by way of 
Additional 
Municipal 
Taxes, 
making an 
effective rate 
of 38.5%) 
Exemption 
during 
exploration 
phase 
 15% + 1.5% 
by way of 
Additional 
Municipal 
Taxes, 
making an 
effective 
rate of 
16.25% 
Exemption 
during 
exploration 
phase 
DR Congo 
 
 
 
 
Law no. 007/2002 
of 11 July 2002 
Decree no. 
038/2003 of 26 
March 2003 
Inter-ministerial 
order no. 
3154/CAB.MIN/MIN
ES/01/2007 and no. 
031/CAB.MIN/FINA
NCES/2007 of 09 
August 2007 
0% - widely-used 
building materials 
0.5% - iron and ferrous 
metals 
1% - industrial minerals 
1% - solid hydrocarbons 
and other substances 
not specified 
2% - non-ferrous metals 
2.5% - precious metals 
4% - precious stones  
No 35%  20% 
Côte 
d'Ivoire 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Law no. 95-553 of 
17 July 1995 
Ordinance no. 96-
600 of 9 August 
1996 
Decree no. 96-634 
of 09 August 
3% - for gold, diamonds, 
precious stones and 
metals 
2.5% - for base metals 
10% free 
equity 
interest 
25% (or 20% 
for 
companies 
whose 
turnover is 
less than 1 
billion CFA 
francs and 
individual 
entrepreneurs  
 12% - 
General-law 
rate 
18% - Profit 
distributions 
which are 
exempt from 
profit tax or 
have not 
been taxed 
at the 
general-law 
rate 
10% - 
Dividends of 
companies 
listed on the 
stock 
exchange 
2% - Income 
from bonds 
that are 
redeemable 
within at 
least 5 years 
Source: Charlet et al. (2013) 
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Appendix 3 Empirical studies on the sharing of rent 
 
Authors Minerals Methods 
Economic 
data 
Tax system simulation  
Sensitivity 
analysis 
Indicators 
Blake 
and 
Roberts 
(2006) 
Oil MAP 
Hypothetical 
project 
Simulation: Comparison of national tax 
systems 
Monte Carlo 
simulation 
  
Alberta: Taxes and royalty 
Net present value 
before tax  
Papua New Guinea: Resource rent tax 
Net present value 
after tax  
Sao Tome: Joint Development Zone 
Tax distortion 
index 
Tanzania: Production sharing and 
resource rent tax 
  
Trinidad: Production sharing only   
Brewer et 
al. (1989) 
Gold DCF 
Hypothetical 
project 
Simulation: Comparison of national tax 
systems 
Ad hoc 
change: 
profitability of 
project, 
inflation, price 
cycle 
Effective tax rate Canada, USA, Australia, Brazil, Chile, 
Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, Peru, 
South Africa, Zambia 
Daniel et 
al. (2008) 
Oil DCF 
Three 
hypothetical 
projects with 
different price 
and cost 
structures 
Initial situation: Royalty with deduction 
of 65% of capital costs, Mozambique. 
Ad hoc 
change: sale 
price and 
discount rate 
Time profile of 
revenue 
Simulation: (i) deduction increased to 
90% plus production sharing, (ii) 
Simulation of other international systems: 
Nigeria, Angola, Eq. Guinea, Mauritania, 
Ghana, Madagascar, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Sierra Leone then Norway, UK, 
Colombia, Australia, East Timor, Peru 
Project pre-tax 
NPV 
Contractor NPV  
Payback period 
Government 
revenue 
AETR, 
Breakeven Price 
and METR 
Government 
share of total 
benefits 
Coefficient ov 
variation of 
government 
revenue 
Post Tax IRR, 
coefficient of 
variation of IRR 
Devereux 
and 
Griffith 
(2003) 
Industry DCF 
Hypothetical 
project 
Simulation: Harmonisation of nominal 
tax rates within the European Union: UK, 
Germany, France 
No 
Net present value 
before tax  
Net present value 
after tax 
Average effective 
tax rate 
Marginal effective 
tax rate  
Lund 
(1992) 
Oil MAP 
 Hypothetical 
project 
Initial situation: Norway: Royalty, 
income tax, corporate tax, special oil tax, 
witholding on dividends, capital tax on 
book value of assets 
Monte Carlo 
simulation 
Net present value Simulation: Zero royalty, production 
allowance, 'uplift' allowance abandoned 
for specific costs, depreciation allowed 
from the date of investment, reduction in 
rate of tax on petroleum 
Otto et al. 
(2006) 
Gold,  
copper, 
bauxite 
DCF 
Three 
hypothetical 
projects with 
different price 
and cost 
structures 
Initial situation: national tax system, 
Chile, South Africa 
Ad hoc 
change: 
operating 
costs, capital 
costs, sale 
price 
Internal rate of 
return of the 
project 
Investor's share 
of rent 
Simulation: Eight different bases for 
mining royalties 
Average effective 
tax rate (AETR) 
Government 
revenue 
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Podda 
Abouna 
et al 
(2014) 
Gold MAP 
Existing 
project 
Canada 
Initial situation: Profit-based royalty, 
Canada  
Monte Carlo 
simulation 
Internal rate of 
return of the 
project 
Average effective 
tax rate 
Simulation: Ad valorem royalty and 
super-profit taxes 
Coefficient of 
variation of 
government 
revenue 
Coefficient of 
variation of 
private-sector 
revenue 
Samis et 
al. (2007) 
Gold 
MAP and 
DCF 
Existing 
project British 
Columbia 
Initial situation: Mongolia: entire tax 
system.  Monte Carlo 
simulation 
Net present value 
Simulation: addition of a super-profit tax 
Thomas 
(2010) 
Gold 
Optimal 
control 
Hypothetical 
project 
Initial situation: Mali: Royalty, income 
tax, taxes on dividends.  
No Net present value 
Simulation: Reduction in the royalty rate 
from 6% to 3%. 
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